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This paper aims to examine whether extended deterrence of Russia over its military allies or 
trading partners is credible. I argue that alliance commitments of Russia’s autocratic leaders with 
ambivalent deterrence policy are unlikely to deter foreign aggressions. Through the multinomial logit 
analysis, I have found that there is little evidence that countries that formed military alliances or trade 
linkages with Russia are likely to increase deterrence success. Rather than hindering disputes, Russia’s 
military alliances are likely to engage in disputes, and more likely in war. Russia’s trading linkages 
have no discernible effect on disputes. These findings imply that faced with the lack of credible alliance, 
N. Korea could be driven into a hands-tied paradox. To escape this dilemma, the U.S. seems more likely 
to accept the practical goal, the reduction of the direct N. Korea’s threat which may bring about the 
cold peace in Northeast Asia.
Keywords: Extended deterrence of Russia, nuclear N. Korea, Nuclear weapons, U.S. nuclear 
negotiations, disputes. 
IntroductIon
scholars believed that the key to the U.s. coercive policy for denuclearization of north 
Korea(hereafter referrered to as n.Korea) was to keep Russia and China, n. Korea's allies, 
away from n. Korea, and to have them participate in the U.s.-led U.n. sanctions against n. 
Korea. Finally, in strong support of Russia and China, which had long been Washington’s 
desire, the u.S. attempted to lead n. Korea to disarm nuclear capabilities by holding a series 
of nuclear negotiations with it from 2018 to 2019. yet, these compellent and coercive policies 
have again been in a deadlock without bringing any substantial nuclear weapons dismantling 
of n. Korea. the u.S. effort to denuclearize n. Korea has already been successful in 
mobilizing all possible means of international politics. 
therefore, this study attempts to evaluate the role of n. Korean allies, particularly 
Russia in resolving the n. Korean nuclear crisis, which is at the opposite point of the U.s., 
the only ally of south Korea (hereafter referrered to as s.Korea). Policy makers are largely 
focusing on china's role in the solution to the n. Korean nuclear crisis, based on china's 
strong economic and military influence over n. Korea today, and not on Russia. It is 
undeniable that China is an important factor in explaining the n. Korean nuclear crisis as a 
military alliance in north Korea, but russia is also an important actor who cannot be missed 
from a strategic point of view. 
Particularly, Russia is a key country that has driven n. Korea to weaponize nuclear 
technology from a perspective of balance with the U.s., and it is a country that cannot be 
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disregarded in evaluating the denuclearization problem of n. Korea today. In the early stages 
of north Korea’s nuclear development, it was just Russia, not China that provided n. Korea 
with the chance to weaponize nuclear technology (lee 2009, 12).1 In response to the uS 
nuclear deployment in s. Korea, the soviet Union began signing a formal agreement with 
n. Korea to cooperate in nuclear research. Furthermore, from 2003 through 2007, Russia 
participated in the six-party talks to resolve n. Korean nuclear issue. Therefore, Russia is 
one of critical countries that cannot be ignored in solving the n. Korean nuclear issue, and it 
is practically significant to evaluate Russia's role as a military alliance of n. Korea. so, this 
paper aims to analyze the reliability of the russian alliance, thereby suggesting its policy 
implications for the u.S.-n. Korean nuclear negotiations. 
A serious question in the n. Korean nuclear crisis issue is whether n. Korea is more 
likely to undergo complete denuclearization in exchange for security guarantee or economic 
gains committed by the U.s. There are, however, some logical inferences that this U.s.-led 
security assurance on n. Korea approach may not prompt n. Korea to dismantle its nuclear 
capabilities completely (lee 2020, 75-76). First, it has been increasingly visible that n. 
Korean nuclear capabilities resulted in what structural realists have consistently predicted 
on nuclear deterrence, reaching the unprecedented equilibrium of mutual fear between n. 
Korea and the u.S. Since 2018, a series of remarkable diplomatic breakthroughs between 
the U.s. and n. Korea led n. Korea to halt nuclear testing and missile launches in exchange 
for stopping or downsizing the U.s. military drills with s. Korea. What most surprises the 
world is that all those frequent militarized disputes in the Korean peninsula for the last 70 
years end up being controllable and man-made under nuclear equilibrium between n. Korea 
and the u.S. Accordingly, the complete denuclearization of n. Korea is to return northeast 
Asia to its former unstable nuclear asymmetry which will push n. Korea into the most 
vulnerable security position. Overall, it is not easy to expect n. Korea to go back to the 
security vulnerability by abandoning its nuclear capabilities. second, without regard to the 
intentions of Russia or China, n. Korea’s nuclear and missile capabilities are a useful means 
of balancing the u.S. within the region. Against the deployment of u.S. tactical nuclear 
weapons on the Korean peninsula in 1958, Russia provided the beginning of north Korea's 
nuclear development by signing an official agreement with north Korea to cooperate in 
nuclear research. In 1965, north Korea began operating the yongbyun nuclear scientific 
Research Center. This was only a power plant, but Kim Il sung became over-interested in 
weaponizing the nuclear technology (Oberdorfer and Carlin 2013, 196-69). With the soviet 
help, n. Korea constructed its first nuclear reactor at yongbyun in 1965 which was later 
expanded to eight-megawatt output in 1974. It eventually became the focus of the U.s. 
suspicions of a nuclear weapons effort in the 1980s (lee 2009, 12). In sum, in support of the 
soviet Union, the n. Korean nuclear armament directly challenges the U.s. backing s. Korea 
with its tactical nuclear deployment for 1958 to 1991 or military presence since then. Finally, 
n. Korea’s complete denuclearization would be its unconditional surrender. By forcing 
n. Korea to comply with full denuclearization, the u.S. aims to consolidate its hegemony 
over northeast asia. Therefore, it is not reasonable to expect that n. Korea fully disarms its 
nuclear capabilities in accordance with these U.s. forces and threats-based coercive policies, 
considering today's northeast Asia, where russia and china's hegemony competition against 
the U.s. is becoming visible.
1 shortly after China’s atomic test in 1964, n. Korea asked for assistance to develop nuclear weapons, 
but china turned down the n. Korean request. 
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empirically, however, from the liberal point of view, there may be the dimmest 
chance for n. Korea to abandon its nuclear capabilities. liberals, adopting the Helsinki 
process, suggest that its allies such as china or russia are more likely to ease its complete 
denuclearization by credibly extending their deterrence over it as the U.s. has been doing 
for s. Korea and Japan (Bobbit 2018). Their resolutions include declaration of the end of the 
Korean War and internationally recognizing current borders inviolate and current regimes. 
In the core of the proposal, Russia or China could play a decisive role on providing reliable 
extended deterrence to n. Korea against the U.s. and its allies in exchange for n. Korean 
denuclearization under the u.n. inspections. It is well-known that the uS security assurance 
has successfully curbed the development of nuclear weapons in Taiwan in 1950s, Japan in 
1960s, and s. Korea in 1970s. 
A related and more serious question of this suggestion is if russian alliance is credible for 
its proteges. In the interdependent decision-making process of nuclear bargaining (shelling 
1996), it is assumed that the U.s. and n. Korea mutually well recognize a variety of options 
and logics left and applicable to both sides. If extended deterrence of Russia turns out to be 
credible, n. Korea is expected to likely abandon its nuclear program in the U.s.-n. Korea 
nuclear negotiations. Otherwise, n. Korea is expected to take more reciprocal approach, 
calling for more significant political and economic concessions from the U.s. and s. Korea 
that correspond to the n. Korea’s phased dismantlement of its nuclear program.       
Russia had provided nuclear-extended-deterrence to its allies such as n. Korea from 
1961 to 1994 and China from 1949 to 1960. yet, we never were able to verify the reliability 
of the extended deterrence of Russia over its allies. accordingly, in the extreme security 
vulnerability in northeast asia, it is practically significant to address the question of whether 
extended deterrence of Russia on its military allies and trading partners is reliable, thereby 
providing policy implications for the U.s.-n. Korean nuclear negotiations. 
In the following, I review the debate on extended deterrence and construct my hypotheses. 
The third section delineates the changing pattern of the deterrence policy of the soviet 
Union. The fourth and fifth sections suggest research design and examine the hypotheses, 
by employing a statistical model. Finally, the last section demonstrates what the findings 
imply for the contemporary northeast Asian security, particularly in dealing with n. Korean 
denuclearization talks.
II. DeTeRRenT eFFeCT OF nUCleaR WeaPOlns anD allIanCe 
Deterrence theories have devised and evolved in the context of nuclear weapons 
developed during the Cold War. In theory, the logic of extended deterrence traditionally 
claims that the credible threat of a defender is the major determinant of deterring attackers 
to its allies. conceptually, general deterrence is differentiated from immediate one, which 
concerns “the relationship between opposing states where at least one side is seriously 
considering an attack while the other is mounting a retaliatory threat to prevent it” (Morgan 
1977, 9). In contrast, extended-general deterrence refers to an attempt of a defender to deter 
an attack on its allies in a situation that there is persistent underlying military confrontation, 
but no clear and present danger of dispute initiation between its allies and opponents. 
Defenders primarily pursue preventing initiators from accelerating peacetime diplomacy 
into military disputes against their allies by employing credible retaliatory threats of military 
forces. a typical case in point is that since 1953, the U.s. has maintained its military presence 
116 JIn MyOUng lee
in s. Korea under a defense pact to prevent n. Korea from initiating another dispute against s. 
Korea (Huth 1999, 27).
Structural realists assume that asymmetric power relations are the major source of 
interstate disputes (Waltz 1993; 2000; Mearsheimer 1990). This assumption is applied to the 
expected utility or game theoretic explanation of a war between nuclear states as a chicken 
game (schelling 1960; 1966). later empirical studies found significant pacifying effect of 
nuclear weapons (Danilovic, 2002; Zagare and Kilgour, 2000; Denardo, 1995; Huth, 1990; 
Waltz, 1993; glasser, 1992; Huth and Russett, 1993; gaddis, 1987; Coale, 1985), but early 
studies didn’t (Huth and Russett 1984; Organski and Kugler 1980). Particularly, some realists 
view that nuclear weapons make state behaviors more cautious as shown in the soviet 
Union and China which were once rogue states (Waltz 1995, 39). Hence, n. Korean nuclear 
armament was assumed to promote peace in the region (Waltz 1995, 38-40).  
Most empirical studies on extended deterrence address the question of whether a 
defender engages in crisis to support its allies. Most of them have paid significant attention 
to examining immediate deterrence (Danilovic 2002; Huth 1990; Huth and Russett 1984; 
Organski and Kugler 1980), but a few on general deterrence (Huth and Russett 1993) because 
of the problem of identifying when a challenge might occur and which states are potential 
defenders and attackers of which targets. 
Recently, scholars pay significant attention to the compellent effect of nuclear weapons 
(shelling 1966, 69-91), contending that nuclear weapons have coercive power regardless of 
opponents’ capabilities. Running a statistical analysis, they find that nuclear states are more 
likely to end disputes without violence and more severe violence is less likely in crises with 
nuclear opponents (asal and Beardsley 2007, 149-150). Their subsequent study reveals that 
nuclear states are more likely to prevail over nonnuclear ones(asal and Beardsley 2009a). 
Their subsequent research discloses that nuclear weapons do confer observable benefits 
to the possessor by making them less likely to be targets of violent aggression (asal and 
Beardsley 2009b: 253). These findings imply that the restraining effect of nuclear weapons is 
the successful outcome of coercive diplomacy. also, emphasizing the importance of nuclear 
superiority for compellence success, the latest research suggests that states with nuclear 
superiority over their nuclear inferior rivals are more likely to achieve their basic goals in 
nuclear crises. The empirical analysis on the fifty-two nuclear crisis dyads reveal that nuclear 
superior states are more likely to win nuclear crises because they are willing to run a greater 
risk of nuclear war than their nuclear inferior opponents (Kroenig 2013). Challenging this 
argument of compellent effect of nuclear weapons, researchers assume that nuclear weapons 
could have a discernible deterrent effect against aggression, but have no compellent effect 
because they are not useful means for disputes, nor are they cheap tools for punishing the 
opponent (sechser and Fuhrmann 2013, 174). The statistical analysis on 200 compellent 
cases uncovers that compellent threats of nuclear states are less likely to succeed than 
nonnuclear. Furthermore, the follow-up statistical analysis on 210 compellent threats and 
case studies on many historical compellent threats, disclose that nuclear weapons have no 
significant coercive advantage (sechser and Fuhrmann 2017). 
In the extant literature, empirical studies on the extended deterrent effect of military 
alliances were conducted in the context of structural realism as well. Overall, the findings 
of empirical research on the deterrent effect of alliance are mixed, and sharply at odds. 
studies that have noted the negative extended deterrent effects of alliances have disclosed 
that alliances serve as a tool for aggression to belligerent countries (altfeld & Bueno de 
Mesquita 1979; sabrosky 1980; siverson & King 1980; Oren 1990) and moral hazards 
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such as increased recklessness due to alliances (snyder & Diesing 1977; snyder 1984; 
1997; Christensen & snyder 1990; smith 1995; yuen 2009) were seen as increasing the 
war probability. The alliance is to make leaders reckless to entrap it even 
in wars they really want to avoid (snyder 1984; 1997; Christensen & snyder 1990). 
There are also empirical studies that explain the peace or conflict tendency of the alliance 
according to the characteristics of the countries that make up the alliance. Statistical analysis 
revealed that the alliances that realize the settlement of territorial disputes are the most 
peaceful, and that the alliances that include superpowers or those that have recently won 
wars are vulnerable to war, and vice versa, peaceful (gibler & vasquez 1998). In another 
study, statistical analysis shows that the deterrent effect of the alliance is different according 
to its purpose. In other words, it was found that the coercive alliance is highly vulnerable to 
conflict, while the deterrent alliance is very unlikely to dispute (Benson 2011). 
studies that have focused on the positive deterrent effect of alliances are largely divided 
into factors of their deterrence success. Traditionally, studies view the military power and 
commitment of defenders as the main determinant of the deterrence success to their allies. 
The traditional defender-centered explanation about extended deterrence of the alliance 
uses various operational indexes for military power (glaser & Kaufmann 1998; Huth 1988; 
Mearsheimer 1983; Russett 1963), national reputation for resolve (schelling 1966), and 
national interest (lieberman 1994; Bar-Joseph 1998; george & smoke 1974; Maxwell 1968). 
Based on the signal approach, this paper aims to explain the deterrent effect of the 
alliance. The signal approach views extended deterrence as a negotiation process and focuses 
on the role of alliance in terms of motivation for alliance formation. The role of alliances 
is seen as a signal that alliances can be used in terms of political relations between alliance 
partners to establish the validity of commitments to deter aggression (smith 1998; 1995; 
Fearon 1997; Morrow 1994; 2000; Huth 1991). The point is that the alliance itself acts as 
a deterrent signal, suppressing the enemy against it. Based on this signal theory, empirical 
evidence of the existence and institutional design of alliances has been presented (Chiba, 
Johnson, leeds 2015; Poast 2013; John and leeds 2011; leeds 2003). 
When war is explained as a negotiation process between rational states, the major concern 
lies on credible communication. The logic of extended deterrence emphasizes the importance 
of the threat credibility of defenders, which is assumed to lead aggressors to change their 
perception of targets. Here, researchers pay significant attention to the signal approach to 
inform the aggressors of the intention of the threat of the use of military force. For example, 
defenders are assumed to enhance their threat credibility by leaving behind the signal that 
the negotiation process is not completely controllable (shelling 1960, 187-203). The main 
causes of war are asymmetric information about relative power and resolve about opponents, 
and wrong negotiation strategy to obtain gains by using it and commitment problems in 
which gains are generated with the breach of the agreement (Fearon 1995, 390-401). The 
dilemma of the threat credibility of the use of military forces comes largely from the fact that 
the threatened are unable to directly observe the preference of the threatening states and that 
they know that the threatening take gains by pretending to be resolved in the use of military 
forces (Fearon 1997, 69). This dilemma could be addressed when the threatening sends to 
the threatened the threat which is costly or risky to the extent that they must unwillingly pay 
for it. the threat of the use of the military force becomes credible to the threatened when it is 
transformed into a costly signal. one way to make a signal costly is to generate audience cost 
that fatal loss is generated when the threat or warning declared officially in crisis is backed 
down. This idea was examined logically in comparison of tying hands signals such as alliance 
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or trip-wire troops of defenders as the examples of costly signals to generate high audience 
costs with sunk-costs such as military build-up or mobilization of defenders, which prompt 
relatively no cost (Fearon 1997). It is found that the tying-hands signal of a defender is more 
likely to generate a high level of threat credibility for its alliance protégé by working as a 
signal of its determined resolve than the sunk-cost signal while it does not prompt much cost 
by itself (Fearon 1997, 82). By contrast, the tying-hands signal strategy is more likely to lead 
defenders to engage unwillingly in disputes because they attempt deterrence by committing 
the use of the military forces (Fearon 1997, 81). In the similar vein, the expected utility logic 
claims that a military alliance is a signal of strong deterrence. the decision for the aggressor 
to initiate the target depends heavily on whether targets have allies or not. When defenders 
are significantly influenced by the outcome of the war, they are expectedly more likely to 
assist its allies, otherwise not (Bueno de Mesquita 1981, 56). 
In the beginning, the extended deterrent effect of the alliance has been analyzed with 
militarized disputes between allies of the U.s. and the soviets (Weede 1983). Besides, 
statistics of the relative dispute frequency indicates that mutual nuclear deterrence is evident 
between nuclear powers as well as their allies (siverson and Tennefoss 1984). Recently, as a 
full-scale study based on the signal theory of alliances, the results of the statistical analysis 
have shown that attackers are less likely to initiate targets when targets have defensive 
alliance while they are more likely to initiate targets when they have an aggressive or neutral 
alliance (leeds 2003). another statistical analysis reports that alliances with major powers, 
high levels of military cooperation, similar foreign policies, and institutionalized structure 
are less likely to be targeted (Johnson et al. 2012). also, it is found that combining multiple 
issues into a single agreement enhances the credibility of alliances, as examined in buffer 
states in alliances with trade provisions experiencing fewer opportunistic violations of the 
alliance terms and fewer attacks (Poast 2012). scholars contend that democratic states are 
more careful to design alliance agreements to deter adversaries. They assume that how 
usefully the formal alliance is designed determine whether states with the alliance are less 
likely to be targets of militarized disputes or not (Chiba et. al. 2015, 969). Conducting the 
empirical analysis on 536 alliance agreements from 1815 to 2003, they find that alliances 
between democracies are more likely to include obligations for future consultation rather 
than active assistance. also, defense pacts between democracies are more likely to specify 
limits to the conditions under which defensive obligations are invoked.
What has been missing in the existing literature on the deterrent effect of nuclear weapons 
and alliances is the lack of empirical analysis on individual major powers, which are the key 
actors in shaping contemporary world politics. In fact, in international conflict, the actual 
behavior of most states, particularly major powers disclose serious discrepancies between 
theory and practice (Waltz 2000; 1993; Zagare and Kilgour 2000; gaddis 1995; Jervis 
1988). accordingly, the findings from empirical analyses about extended deterrence against 
all nuclear powers call into question their applicability to the real world. the theoretical 
usefulness of extended deterrence is more likely when the empirical analysis on extended 
deterrence pursued by individual superpowers is carried out, respectively. 
III. RUssIa UnDeR aUTHORIan RegIMe anD aMBIvalenT DeTeRRenCe 
POlICy
I postulate that security assurances of russia are unlikely to deter foreign aggression to 
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their military allies or trading partners. I first argue that the alliance commitments of Russia’s 
authoritarian leaders to protect their military protégés or trading partners are not effectively 
believable to aggressors. In addition, I assume that the ambivalent deterrence policy over 
Russia’s allies is not credible to aggressors. 
When the logic of the costly signal approach is applied to the case of Russia, security 
guarantees of Russian leaders under long-standing authoritarian regime over its allies are not 
credible to aggressors. Polity Iv country report shows that Russia has significantly developed 
democratic mechanisms, particularly being altered from the soviet Union (gurr and Jaggers 
2016).2 yet, as of 2010, it still remains autocratic in its regime trends.3 Before 1989, the 
soviet Union was categorized as an autocratic regime, displaying constantly the level of -7 
among ranges from -10 to 10 according to the Polity Iv country. From 1989 to 1990, the 
soviet Union was transformed to the Russian Federation, representing the sharp increase in 
its regime trends to 5 and 6 at the peak around 2005. Regarding executive recruitment, Russia 
accomplished its first peaceful and democratic transfer of executive power in its history 
as President vladimir Putin was elected in 2000. yet, the long-lasting presence of Putin in 
the presidency and his apparent indifference to democracy become a source of concern for 
supporters of political liberalism which reflects democratic norms and institutions in their 
infancy. Polity Iv defines executive constraints of Russia as moderate limitations. Russia 
has seen the formation of numerous political parties, but few have been substantial or lasting 
which represents that Russia’s parties are weak and fluid in nature. While no oppositional 
parties were restricted in their activities, opposition parties have the inability to design a 
common platform and alliance which to more effectively challenge the President’s position. 
as a result, as of 2010, Russia’s democratic level is defined as 1 and its autocratic level as 5. 
Overall, while Russia has accomplished unprecedented democratic transition, it is coded as 4 
which represents an autocratic regime.  
In the audience cost logic, leaders can credibly communicate their intentions because 
their domestic political survival resorts to their ability to honor their commitments. 
accordingly, “absolute rulers, who cannot be removed, cannot communicate their intentions 
to other nations” (smith 1998, 632). autocratic leaders who are less likely to jeopardize their 
domestic political prospect have less audience costs than electorally vulnerable democratic 
leaders. In sum, foreign policy statements of autocratic leaders of Russia (soviet Union) are 
unlikely to deter foreign aggression because the pledge to intervene is not credible. 
also, I assume that the ambivalent deterrence policy over Russia’s allies is not credible 
to aggressors. Hence, I posit that effective extended deterrence of Russian alliance is 
unlikely. In the early days, the soviet Union developed the concept of deterrence through 
refusal while the U.s. emphasized it through retaliation. Overall, compared to the nuclear-
oriented deterrence policy of the u.S., centering on deterrence through retaliation, russia 
adopted relatively refusal-oriented deterrence policy. During the stalin era, the military 
strategy centered on the ground forces and treated nuclear weapons as complementary 
means. The reason why Russia emphasized the importance of the conventional weapons-
oriented deterrence policy is that it mainly aimed at annexing comprehensive Western 
Europe. contrary to the u.S., which has attempted to restrict its battlespace, russia has 
rather expected to expand it, but in principle, pursued any type of war (Freedman 2003, 105). 
also, this conventional weapons-oriented policy states the defensive characteristic to defend 
2 http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/Russia2010.pdf.
3 https://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/rus2.htm.
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its territory (Freedman 2003, 243). after the mid-1950s when nikita Khrushchev came to 
recognize the possibility of all-out nuclear war, russia transformed to the defense system 
centering on nuclear weapons, developing the ICBMs and unmanned spacecraft earlier than 
the U.s. He led the soviet to adopt an offensive strategy that defined the first use of nuclear 
weapons to compensate for the conventional weapons in the lower quality in the early 1960s. 
In the 1960s, Robert Mcnamara established a concept of assured retaliation, which implies 
assured destruction and mutually assured destruction. the reciprocal fear about initiation 
is deterred by the retaliatory capability. When both parties maintain assured retaliatory 
capability, they could reach a stable equilibrium of fear (Freedman 2003, 236). Mcnamara 
viewed that the more similar the mutual understandings and principles could produce the 
better soviet-U.s. relations managed well (Freedman 2003, 235). The soviets adopted 
the U.s.-led mutually assured destruction theory. In 1968, the soviets signed the non-
proliferation treaty. Then, the soviets started to agree to reduce the useless nuclear weapons 
based on the assured retaliatory capabilities. of course, when the u.S. deployed tactical 
nuclear weapons in europe along with the flexible response policy devised by Mcnamara, 
the soviets came to reemphasize the importance of the conventional weapons. By the 1980s, 
soviet leaders came to believe that nuclear war was winnable with the first strike, unrestraint, 
and superior number policies (Fravel and Medeiros 2010, 57). Russia was therefore able to 
hold Western europe in hostage. at the time, Russia tried to advance its retaliatory capability 
by dispersing the deployment of strategic weapons. In the late 1980s, Mikhail gorbachev 
emerged, suggesting the concept of the global common security, contending the ultimate 
dismantlement of nuclear weapons. 
Overall, Russia has posed ambivalent extended-deterrence policy over its allies. On the 
surface, Russia provided east european and asian allies with security assurances as the U.s. 
has done to her allies in the naTO, Middle east, and east asia. yet, the soviet invasion of 
Hungary (1956), Czechoslovakia (1968), and afghanistan (1979) all are the clear reflection 
of its willingness to use violent forces to its allies. Contrary to the extended-deterrence policy 
of the U.s., Russia has never officially declared its extended-deterrence policy, thereby 
remaining undefined on that policy. 
Of course, in the great turmoil of the 1990s, as Russia’s weakness in most other measures 
of global power and influence, including its vulnerable geostrategic position and inferior 
general-purpose forces and cutting-edge military technology was disclosed, russia came 
to perceive nuclear weapons as the key security guarantee and an intrinsic attribute of great 
power (Rojansky 2013, 297-99). In 1993, Russia took a more aggressive nuclear posture by 
dropping the no-first-use policy adopted in 1982 (schmemann 1993). Furthermore, the 2000 
military doctrine states that Russia reserves the right to utilize nuclear weapons in response 
to conventional weapons against it and its allies (sokov 1999). since 2010, Russia allowed 
nuclear weapons to be used in the very existence of Russia under threat. It might assign 
nuclear weapons to local conflicts, which would have represented a massive expansion of 
the role of nuclear weapons in Russian security policy (sokov 2010). also, Russia dropped 
the pledge that it would not employ nuclear weapons against nPT-states without nuclear 
weapons (Russian Federation Ministry of Defense 2015). Furthermore, its 2010 military 
doctrine declared the limited use of nuclear weapons when russia or its allies are initiated 
with nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction (Quinlivan and Oliker 2011, 18). 
But with the dissolution of the Warsaw Treaty Organization and the soviet Union, half of 
its withdrawal states and allies have joined the naTO. scholarship identified total 9 nuclear-
extended-deterrence cases provided by the soviet during the Cold War, such as China (1949-
eXTenDeD-DeTeRRenT eFFeCT OF RUssIa  121
60), albania (1955-91), Bulgaria (1949-89), Czechoslovakia (1955-91), east germany (1955-
91), Hungary (1949-89), Poland (1949-89), Romania (1949-89), n. Korea (1961-94) (Rapp-
Hooper, 2015: 9). Besides, a total of five extended-deterrence cases provided by Russia 
after the Cold War are identified as such armenia (2001-present), Belarus (2002-present), 
Kazakhstan (2002-present), Kyrgyzstan (2002-present), and Tajikistan (2002-present). yet, 
in 1997, former soviet allies of Hungary, the Czech Republic and Poland joined the naTO. 
In particular, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, members of the CsTO, which 
are security allies of Russia, are defined as partners of the naTO. accordingly, extended 
deterrence of Russia over her allies is still ambivalent. It is thus necessary to be explicitly 
defined one way or another because it is not just by-product of alliance relationship. 
In sum, I argue that security assurances of Russia over its military allies are not credible 
due to it long-lasting autocratic regime and its ambivalent deterrence policy. I construct a 
hypothesis with the testable implications as follows: 
H1, A country that forms a military alliance with Russia is unlikely to increase deterrence 
success against its enduring rivals. 
The costly signal logic can be applied to extended deterrence of Russia over its trading 
partners as well as military allies. Traditionally, the liberal hypothesis on trade and conflict 
implies that trading partners are abstained from involving in disputes due to the fear about 
the dispute cost outweighing the trade gains (Hegre et al 2010; gelpi and grieco 2008; 
Mansfield and Pollins 2001; Oneal and Russett 1999; Russett et al 1998; Oneal and Russett 
1997; Barbieri 1996). The role of economic interdependence has been empirically analyzed 
largely in the cases of extended-immediate deterrence (Huth and Russett 1984; Huth 1988; 
Danilovic 2002; signorino and Tarar 2006). Recently the extended general deterrent effect of 
trade relations was analyzed between members of regional trade organizations (aydin 2010). 
the costly signal theory assumes that militarized disputes break out when the will of 
initiation between states comes into conflict. Here, disputes are not just the results of the 
confrontation of relative power, but of the competition of relative resolve between rivals. 
as illustrated in the extended-deterrent role of alliance states with close trade linkages seem 
to have the abundant means to signal explicit intention to pursue costly actions like the loss 
of trade gains in crisis. Countries in close trade relations are expected to avoid militarized 
disputes because they exchange these costly signals (Morrow 1999, 487). It is more effective 
to exchange signals between democratic states because they are assumed to have higher 
audience costs (Fearon 1997). Recent research empirically examined that the interdependent 
relations in the capital market as well as trade linkages decrease the uncertainty of relative 
dispute resolve and weaken the necessity of disputes because they are at work as costly 
signals (gartzke et al 2001).   
In addition to the military alliance, the costly signal approach views that trade linkages 
are more likely to deter militarized disputes between states due to their signal characteristics. 
Conventionally, it is mainly assumed that the pacifying effect of trade relations arises from 
the substitution effect of trade loss. that is, trade partners are assumed to abstain from 
involving in disputes due to the fear about the cost of the dispute outweighing the trade 
gains. Based on this causal mechanism, most empirical research has paid significant attention 
to the deterrent effect of trade linkages. Besides, the role of economic interdependence has 
been empirically analyzed largely in the cases of extended-immediate deterrence (Huth and 
Russett 1984; Huth 1988; Danilovic 2002; signorino and Tarar 2006). The closeness of 
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political relations is reflected in economic relations. “states in very close relations do not 
have to form alliances to show that they share interests” (Morrow 1999, 488). yet, a few 
researchers have analyzed the role of economic relations in general extended deterrence. 
When the costly signal logic is applied to Russia, the expectation of extended deterrence 
of Russia over its trading partners goes into reverse because Russian leaders under the 
autocratic regime who are assumed to be electorally invulnerable have lower audience costs. 
It is more effective to exchange signals between democratic states because they are assumed 
to have higher audience costs (Fearon 1997). When Russian leaders send a signal to initiate 
some threats to use military forces or to sever trade linkages against targeted aggressors to 
protect their trading partners, those aggressors do not interpret these threats as a credible 
signals with high probability of dispute outbreak because they do not mortgage their domestic 
political survival on their ability to honor their commitments. In sum, to examine extended 
deterrence of Russia, I construct a hypothesis with the testable implications as follows:  
H2: A country that has formed trade linkages with Russia is unlikely to increase 
deterrence success against its enduring rivals. 
Iv. ReseaRCH DesIgn
To test the above hypotheses, I constructed a research model containing a dependent 
variable of dispute occurrence between an attacker and target, two independent variables 
of military allies and trading partners with Russia and its protégés, and control variables of 
relative capability, geographical proximity, joint democracy, and post-cold war. The unit of 
analysis is dyad/year over the period under the analysis of 1950-2001, which is based on 
the accessibility of data. Utilizing the eugene expected Utility generation and Management 
Program,4 I constructed a pooled time series-cross sectional data set, based on the enduring 
rivalry data set (Klein et al 2006). What is the most challenging in quantitatively analyzing 
the effect of the general-extended-deterrence of the Russian alliance is to identify the cases 
of extended-general deterrence which calls for clarifying when a challenge might occur and 
which states are potential defenders and attackers of which targets. one way to minimize the 
wrong samples is to employ the enduring rivalry data set. Deterrence is an attempt to prevent 
others from challenging the status quo. Hence, deterrence is not targeted to countries that 
are satisfied with maintaining the status quo. That is why I employ the enduring rivalry dyad 
that reflects explicitly long-standing hostile countries. The data set excludes cases where 
the absence of attack can meaningfully be considered general deterrence success. Another 
challenging part of this research is the work to combine the information of the military allies 
and trading partners of russia. 
In my research model, the dependent variable is the deterrence success or failure, which 
is measured with the absence or occurrence of militarized disputes in a dyad, respectively. 
scholars define deterrence in a narrow sense, mainly including military means (Freedman 
2004; Morgan 2003; 1983; Huth 1988), rarely to a broad sense, including non-military means 
such as economic sanctions and diplomatic exclusion (Russett 1963). In essence, deterrence 
is to manipulate opponents’ behavior by threatening them with harm. “The behavior of 
4 eugene expected Utility generation and Data Management Program (version 3.204). http://
eugenesoftware.org/
eXTenDeD-DeTeRRenT eFFeCT OF RUssIa  123
concern to the deterrer is an attack; hence, deterrence involves the threat of force in response 
as a way of preventing the first use of force by someone else” (Morgan 1983, 11). also, 
deterrence is defined as “a policy that seeks to persuade an adversary, through the threat 
of military retaliation” (Huth 1988, 15). For clarity, it is opposed to including nonmilitary 
tools in defining deterrence (Morgan 2003, 119). as the narrowest definition, deterrence is 
a military means of statecraft (Freedman 2004, 36-40). In this study, I focus on interstate 
aggression to specify the extended deterrent effects of nuclear weapons and military alliances. 
The dependent variable is operationalized with the 3-point scale dispute categories 
consisting of no occurrence of disputes, low severity disputes, and war, based on the dyadic 
Militarized Interstate Disputes Data of Correlates of War Project (MID) (Palmer et al 2015). 
The MIDs are defined as “united historical cases of conflict in which the threat, display, or 
use of military force short of war by one member state is explicitly directed towards the 
government, official representatives, official forces, property, or territory of another state” 
(Jones et al 1996). In the international conflict field, the MID data have become a widely 
used resource, and most recent research on dyadic interstate conflict tends to look at MIDs, 
including wars. In model 1, I transform 5-point scale outcome categories in the MID data set 
to a 3-point scale by defining threat, display, and use of forces as one low severity dispute. 
now, the redefined 3-point scale variable ranges from no occurrence of disputes coded as 0, 
low severity disputes as one of threat, display, or use of forces, coded as 1, to war coded as 2. 
some may question that this conceptualization of the dependent variable does not capture 
the realities of nuclear deterrence because nuclear deterrence is qualitatively different from 
conventional deterrence (Waltz 1998, 625). yet, there are empirical and logical bases for not 
requiring an analytical distinction between nuclear and conventional deterrence. empirically, 
there is evidence that nuclear weapons do not restrain the hostility (Organski and Kugler 
1980) or escalatory behavior of non-nuclear states (geller 1990; Paul 1994). logical defects 
are attributed to the classical deterrence theory that nuclear warfare is the worst possible 
outcome for all sides. If conflict - nuclear or conventional - is the worst outcome, deterrence 
cannot ever be successful because any attacked state will always capitulate rather than 
fight, and knowing this, challengers will always attack (Quackenbush 2011). Put together, 
this paper is based on the argument that the deterrence theory should focus on general 
explanations of the dynamics of deterrence rather than the limited explanation of nuclear or 
conventional deterrence.      
The research model has two independent variables: the military alliance and trade 
relations between Russia and the target. The credibility of Russia’s extended deterrence 
is measured with the deterrent effect of a country with russian military alliance or trade 
linkages on the MIDs against its enduring rivalries. If extended deterrence of Russia is 
credible, a country with russian military alliance or trade linkage is less likely to engage 
in militarized disputes against its enduring rivalry. For the operational index of the military 
alliance, in a dyad of an attacker and target, when the target is engaged in a defensive pact, 
a neutral pact, or entente with russia, the dyad is coded as 1, otherwise 0. Alliance data is 
based on the COW Formal alliance v4.1 (gibler 2009). Trade linkages between Russia and 
its protégés are measured by using the natural log of their bilateral trade share of Russia’s 
total trade, utilizing the Trade v4.0 of the COW Project (Barbieri et al 2009).   
I controlled for relative capabilities between an attacker and target in my dependent 
variable. Relative capabilities are measured with the natural log of the sum of the capabilities 
of the two countries in dyad. The national capability data is obtained from the COW Project 
national Material Capabilities v5.0 (singer et al 1972). Geographical contiguity is another 
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control variable. Contiguity is found most significant in increasing the likelihood of disputes. 
The contiguity is defined with direct proximity ranging from two states with touching 
borders to those states separated by 400 miles or less of open water. noncontiguous states 
are thus less likely to engage in disputes. This dichotomous variable is coded as 1 if two 
states are contiguous, otherwise as 0. Contiguity data is derived from the COW Project 
Direct Contiguity Data, 1816-2016, v3.2 (stinnett et al. 2002). Contiguity is expected to be 
positively associated with dyadic disputes. Many studies have found that conflict between 
democratic systems is minimal (Bennett and stam 2004; Maoz and Russet 1993; Dixon 
1994; Bremer 1992). Using data from the Polity Iv data set (Marshall et al. 2018), a variable 
measuring the level of joint democracy in a dyad is constructed. The Joint democracy 
variable ranges from zero to one hundred and is calculated in the following formula: Joint 
democracyij= {(Democracyi-Autocracyi+10)/2} × {(Democracyj-Autocracyj+10)/2}. 
I expect a negative relationship between Joint Democracy and the occurrence of dyadic 
disputes. Finally, I added controls for Post-Cold War in disputes because inter-state disputes 
are generally on significant decline since the collapse of the cold war. 
v. analysIs anD evalUaTIOn
To test the hypotheses constructed above, I conducted a multinomial logit regression 
analysis due to the dependent variable consisting of the 3-point scale outcome categories of 
militarized disputes: no occurrence of disputes, low severity disputes, and war. In practice, 
militarized interstate disputes have two kinds of inherent tendencies. Those disputes are 
interdependent between precedent and follow-up events and are very rare, which violate the 
underlying assumptions for the statistical regression model. to address these problems, I 
utilize the duration dependent technique with peace-year and three cubic splines variables 
from the BTsCs algorithm (Beck et al. 1998). In the logit model, no single interpretation 
method can lead to fully delineate the relationship between variables and outcome because 
the logit model is nonlinear. I present the factor change in the odds as shown in table 1 and 
interpret the direction and magnitude of the impact of independent variables. 
table 1 addresses my main research question of whether military or economic ties with 
Russia under ambivalent deterrence policy are likely to inhibit disputes for the period of 
1950-2001 under analysis in enduring rivalry dyads. When all control variables are held 
constant on their average for continuous or 0 in binomial ones, these results are interpreted as 
follows. 
Overall, as I expected in the hypotheses, the results of the statistical analysis show that 
countries that have formed military alliances or trade linkages with Russia are unlikely 
to increase deterrence success. Direct evidence to support the primary hypothesis of this 
paper was disclosed in the variable of Russia’s military allies, which significantly increase 
the likelihood that dyads engage in war. Countries that have formed military alliances with 
russia are far more likely to engage in war. Both Russia’s military allies and trading partners 
had no significant impact on disputes (threat, display, and use of military forces). similarly, 
Russia’s trading partners had no discernible effect on war and the combined effect of Russia’s 
military allies and trading partners was not significant on disputes and war. Hence, I could 
conclude with confidence that there is little evidence that extended deterrence of Russia over 
its military allies or trading partners is credible. 
Firstly, and most importantly, the results of the statistical analysis reveal that, rather than 
eXTenDeD-DeTeRRenT eFFeCT OF RUssIa  125
hindering disputes, Russia’s military allies are less likely to increase deterrence success. 
Particularly, in strong support of my hypothesis, countries that have formed military 
alliances with russia are far more likely to engage in war as the highest severity level 
against their enduring rivalries than otherwise, as indicated by the statistically significant 
and positive coefficient for Russian military allies (β=1.43). likewise, countries that have 
formed a military alliance with russia are likely to engage in disputes (threat, display, and 
use of military forces), but having no statistical significance. The coefficient for Russia’s 
military allies over disputes (β=0.38) remains positive with the complete disappearance of 
its statistical significance. Military alliances with Russia, therefore, do not inhibit conflict, 
appearing rather to bring about increased tensions, particularly war.   
In support of my hypothesis, Russia’s trading partners have no discernible effect on 
disputes. as expected, the results from Table 1 indicate that, rather than reducing the 
likelihood that dyads would engage in militarized disputes, countries that formed trade 
linkages with russia would add a boost to increased military tensions, as noted in the 
positive coefficient for Russia’s trading partners on disputes (β=0.68) and war (β=.50). But, 
their associations are statistically insignificant.     
The coefficient for Russian allies*partners on disputes (β=1.33) which is the combined 
effect of Russia’s military allies and trading partners remains positive and statistically 
insignificant, similar to those observed in Russia’s military allies or trading partners on 
disputes and war, respectively. yet, that for Russian allies*partners on war (β=-6.82) has 
drastically changed, but only in its direction, turning to a negative sign with statistical 
insignificance. When a country forms both military alliances and trade relations with Russia, 
Table 1. extended-deterrent effect of Russia over its military allies and trading partners on disputes in 
enduring rivalry dyads, 1950-2001  
disputes
(Threat/Display/Use of forces) War
Coefficient p>|z| Coefficient p>|z|
Russia’s military allies 0.38 0.18  1.43 0.00***
Russia’s trading partners 0.68 0.39  0.49 0.70
Russia’s allies*partners 1.33 0.90  -6.81 0.57
Major power -0.50 0.01*  0.43 0.19
Relative power  -0.02 0.94 -1.31 0.06
Proximity 0.61 0.04* -1.08 0.00**
Joint democracy -0.00 0.23 0.00 0.41
Post-Cold War 0.23 0.17 -0.09 0.78
Peace years -1.17 0.00*** -1.93 0.00***
spline1 -0.00 0.00** -0.00 0.01*
spline2 -0.05 0.00*** -0.08 0.00***
spline3 0.01 0.00*** 0.02 0.00***
constant -0.19 0.60 -0.77 0.14
number of observations =1676 lR chi2(24)=545.35 Probability>chi2=0.000 
log likelihood=-1010.937 Pseudo R2=0.212
* p<0.01, ** p<0.001, *** p<0.0001 
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it is unlikely to engage in war, but insufficient to promote peace.   
These findings are quite consistent with those from the recent empirical analysis on China 
(lee 2020). Russia and China are comparable in regime type and deterrence policy. China 
is a long-standing autocratic regime, adopting a lean and limited deterrence policy over its 
military allies. employing the logit regression analysis on enduring rivalry data set for the 
period of 1950-2000, the research concluded that there is little evidence that military or 
economic ties with China are less likely to inhibit conflicts.    
The findings from control variables uncover great surprises for those unfamiliar with 
previous studies. These discrepancies from the previous studies may be reflected from certain 
characteristics of enduring rivalries on militarized disputes. Dyads with one major power 
are less likely to engage in disputes (β=-.505) with statistically appreciable significance, but 
more likely in war (β=.43) with statistical insignificance. Dyads with greater disparities of 
power are not associated with both disputes (β= -0.02) and war (β= -1.31). Between enduring 
rivalries, proximity has a statistically significant positive effect on the likelihood of disputes 
(β=0.61), which is consistent with that of empirical studies. However, it is less likely to 
engage in war (β= -1.08) with statistical significance, which is anomalous to that of previous 
studies. dyads with more democratic states are not associated with disputes (β=-0.00) or 
war (β=0.41). The end of the Cold War does not have statistical effect on the probability that 
dyads will engage in militarized disputes.        
table 2 represents the percentage change of odds of war along with the alliance change 
with Russia. I calculated the marginal effects of the target countries with Russian alliance, 
demonstrating how an increase from no alliance to an alliance with russia affects the 
predicted probability from 1) disputes (threat, display, and use of military forces) to war and 2) 
no disputes to war, holding all other variables at their means for continuous ones or zero for 
dummy ones.
The results reveal that in enduring rivalries when a target country newly forms a military 
alliance with russia, initiators are more likely to accelerate disputes to wars by 186.5%, as 
indicated by the statistically significant and positive predicted probability. In addition, in 
enduring rivalries, the statistically significant and positive predicted probability shows that 
when a target country newly forms a military alliance with russia, an aggressor is more 
likely to initiate war against the target by 320.1%. 
In sum, the critical finding from the statistical analysis is that in enduring rivalries, the 
statistically significant positive coefficient for Russia’s military alliance on war reveals that 
countries in the presence of alliance with russia appear more likely to engage war. yet, 
the statistically insignificant and positive coefficients for Russia’s trading partners on low 
severity or war disclose that countries in trade linkages with russia are not associated with 
militarized disputes.    
vI. COnClUsIOn: POlICy IMPlICaTIOns FOR THe U.s.-n. KORean nUCleaR 
negOTIaTIOn
This paper tests whether extended-general deterrence of Russia over its military allies and 
trading partners is credible. I assume that the military alliances or trade linkages with russia 
work as signals that Russia sends to aggressors its resolve to engage in crisis. I argue that the 
alliance commitments of Russia’s authoritarian leaders to protect their military proteges or 
trading partners are not believable to aggressors because their commitments are not costly. 
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also, the deterrence policies of Russia seem ambivalent. The results of the statistical analyses 
presented here reveal that there is little evidence that countries that have formed military 
alliances or trade linkages with russia are more likely to increase deterrence success.    
These findings have significant theoretical implications for the research on extended-
deterrence and practical implications for northeast asian security. In particular, the findings 
unfold that countries that have formed a military alliance with Russia are more likely to 
engage in war. In theory, the costly signal approach implies that the signal of russian military 
alliance is not so costly enough to deter the resolve of initiators against Russian allies because 
russia has long adopted the authoritarian regime or not fully consolidated the democratic 
system. In contrast, some states are so resolved that they take a firm strategic position at the 
unavoidable cost of war (Fearon 1994, 583). strongly determined attackers could threaten 
protégés allied to a defender, taking high risks of war (Huth and Russett 1984, 517). Beyond 
this simple interpretation based on the causal mechanism of the costly signal approach, 
testing extended-deterrence faces inherently a methodological problem, implying a potential 
endogeneity that no countries without external threat or conflict-proneness are motivated to 
form alliance relations. Countries most likely in conflict-proneness are more motivated and 
driven to form a military alliance. Hence, the findings presented here are not surprising. 
In practice, the findings have profound policy implications on northeast asian security, 
particularly the contemporary u.S. and n. Korean nuclear negotiations. All other things 
being equal, my findings that there is little evidence on the extended-deterrent power of 
Russia over its military or trading partners, allow me to provide certain policy prescriptions 
for the contemporary nuclear talks between the U.s. and n. Korea. The findings presented 
here could deliver a reasonable explanation about the reason why n. Korea was desperately 
motivated to obtain nuclear weapons. also, these findings convey the future trajectory on 
what could be the possible path of nuclear talks and solutions mutually agreeable between n. 
Korea and the u.S.
The findings presented here are consistent with those of the existing research that 
while nuclear threat dissuades nonnuclear states to obtain nuclear weapons through fear 
of preventive war (gartzke and Jo 2007, 184), security vulnerability derived from nuclear 
asymmetry is more likely to contribute to nuclear proliferation. Under security vulnerability 
in nuclear asymmetry, states by nature have two options, either to obtain their nuclear 
weapons or to rely on extended deterrence of other nuclear states. The case in point is exactly 
n. Korea, which was driven to develop a nuclear weapons program. In 1961, n. Korea 
formed a bilateral military treaty with the nuclear soviet, which nullified it from 1991 to 
2000, emphasizing cooperation with S. Korea. In the lack of a nuclear umbrella of russia, 
n. Korea prompted to develop a nuclear weapons program. The existing research contends 
that the lack of security guarantees by nuclear states increases the willingness to proliferate, 
even more, accelerated with the unilateral policy of U.s. hegemony and the nuclear umbrella 
of Russia on the decline (gartzke and Jo 2007, 187). The findings presented here can well 
Table 2. Percentage change of odds of war to russian alliance change  
low severity dispute → War no dispute → War
Change (%) Change (%)
target with russian alliance 186.5* 320.1***
* p<0.01, ** p<0.001, *** p<0.0001
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explain the reason why n. Korea is quite obsessed with security guarantees provided by the 
U.s., as shown in the recent nuclear talks between the U.s. and n. Korea. even though n. 
Korea reentered into the bilateral military treaty with russia in 2001, it should be a critical 
mistake should it believe that the extended deterrence of Russia on it is reliable.
on the contrary, is n. Korea more belligerent towards its major competitors, S. Korea, 
the U.s., or Japan after obtaining nuclear weapons? More explicitly, is n. Korea more likely 
to commit suicide after successfully developing its self-help system of nuclear and missile 
capabilities by initiating war against s. Korea and the U.s.? In fact, for the last 70 years, 
the U.s. foreign policy has been designed and executed based on the underlying assumption 
that n. Korea is more likely to attack S. Korea and the u.S., which is quite anomalous from 
the theoretical perspective. Paradoxically, however, since June 2018, when the nuclear 
bargaining between n. Korea and the u.S. was launched, what most astonishingly strikes the 
global society is that all those ceaseless enduring militarized disputes between two Koreas 
are controllable and man-made. n. Korea immediately stopped a series of nuclear tests and 
missile launches in exchange for the suspension or downsizing of those comprehensive 
and annual joint military exercises led by the U.s. which are precisely identified with the 
considerable level of militarized interstate disputes. yet, n. Korea's nuclear and missile 
capabilities reachable to the U.s. homeland brought up what structural realists have 
consistently and exactly predicted: the cold peace of equilibrium of mutual fear between n. 
Korea and the U.s. as a last isolated balancer, the U.s. has intervened in a decisive crisis 
of nuclear n. Korea, which is not clear to be seen as a result of its perception change on n. 
Korea as a normal state, not a rogue anymore. But, it is not easy to believe that the U.s. is 
still haunted with its deep-rooted assumption that n. Korea is more likely to commit suicide 
by initiating a nuclear attack on s. Korea or the U.s. “It did in 1950 only after prominent 
american congressmen, military leaders, and other officials said that we would not fight in 
Korea. n. Korea’s external behavior has sometimes been ugly, but certainly not reckless, 
showing no inclination to risk suicide” (Waltz 1995, 39).  
In response to a nuclear threat, even more in the lack of reliable ally, which my findings 
imply, n. Korea has no option other than resorting to nuclear weapons for its security. 
The U.s. may face significant difficulties in completely denuclearizing n. Korea which is 
unconditional surrender. n. Korea has disclosed a serious security vulnerability in the lack of 
credible alliances. yet, it in return has never lost its autonomy, which led to building internal 
arms such as nuclear weapons. It is known that n. Korea is quite resolved to obtain security 
guarantees at the cost of nuclear weapons which otherwise wouldn't give up those weapons. 
yet, when the underlying assumption of security maximizer is applied to both the U.s. and 
n. Korea, nuclear weapons and security assurances are inherently unmatchable. considered 
into the cases of the 2003 removal of saddam Hussein, the 2011 collapse of libyan 
Qaddafi regime, and 2014 Russian annexation on the Crimea, these two means may not be 
exchangeable. so it is quite difficult to imagine that the primary and substantive goal for n. 
Korea is to seek security assurances committed by the U.s. eventually, states enhance its 
security either or both in internal arms and ally reliability, which could be complementary. In 
the lack of reliable alliance, n. Korea is driven into the hands-tied paradox, which influences 
outcomes by weakening its position by reducing its options or relinquishing initiatives. 
For the last 70 years, the U.s. has undertaken a comprehensive and thorough containment 
policy against n. Korea. recently, it has successfully coerced russia and china, which 
are defenders and military allies of n. Korea, to join the tough economic sanctions led by 
the U.n. over n. Korea. Finally, turning aside from the deterrence policy carried out by its 
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predecessors, the trump administration triggered the compellent threat with no deadline 
for automatic engagement, but with preemptive war policy to dismantle n. Korean nuclear 
weapons. Here, the U.s. successfully cornered n. Korea, leaving it the last clear chance to 
resist or comply with its policy. unlike Vietnam which challenged the compellent threat 
of the U.s., n. Korea complied with the U.s. policy. yet, the compellent threat of the U.s. 
seemed quite workable, but only in stopping n. Korea's initiating display of forces, as shown 
in a series of nuclear weapons testing and missile launch.  
the diplomatic negotiations between the two countries would determine how to 
completely dismantle nuclear weapons of n. Korea. In particular, the nuclear bargaining may 
reverse the strategic positions between the U.s. and n. Korea. Paradoxically, in the nuclear 
bargaining, what the u.S. has successfully put n. Korea into a corner in support of russia 
and China as well as its compellent threat, is driven into a position where n. Korea no longer 
have many choices left. Considered into the soviet compliance during the Cuban missile 
crisis in exchange for the withdrawal of Turkish missile base, while n. Korean demands may 
be clearly defined as security assurances, the U.s., the aggressor’s demands may have no 
such obvious definition on n. Korean denuclearization in confusion from grand bargaining 
in its favor to phased implementation in n. Korean favor. In sum, in the interdependent 
decision-making process of nuclear bargaining, it is assumed that the u.S. and n. Korea 
mutually well recognize a variety of options left to the U.s. and no option left to n. Korea. 
Furthermore, n. Korean nuclear armament is theoretically evaluated as the completion of the 
equilibrium of power between two hostile coalitions led by the u.S. and china.5 considering 
the northeast asian system and its balancing tendencies (lee, 2016), on all occasions, we 
should not expect that n. Korea with no credible military allies will fully agree to completely 
denuclearize unless the u.S. makes considerable concession on n. Korean nuclear capability. 
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